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EvidenceCm nf: ~ Doctor-Patient Privilege

Doctor, Doctor, Mr. M.D.:
Dr./Patient privilege in MT
Opinion 5.05 - Confidentiality

"I was feeling so bad
I asked my family doctor just what I had,
I said 'Doctor, Doctor, Mr. M.D.,
Can you tell me what's ailing me?"'
- "Good Lovin"' by the Young Rascals
Any doctor worth her salt would need to know a bit more
before providing an answer to the question (diagnosis) and a
solution (prescription). The necessary additional information
comes, at least in part, from the patient's own description of the
symptoms and their inception. The "history" component of the
patient's visit reflects the doctor's notes about what the patient
told her, and often contains extremely sensitive information that
may help the physician discern and/or fix the medical problem.
Doctors and patients generally assume that the patient's
disclosures are confidential and intend to keep them that way.
The law has a different understanding of the situation, and in
many cases can compel both production of the written medical
record and oral testimony about what was said in the "privacy"
of the doctor's office. Thus, the doctor-patient privilege differs
significantly from the attorney-client and spousal privileges.
As I have discussed in earlier columns, every assertion of privilege necessarily deprives the fact-finder of valuable
information. The Legislature's extension of privilege to communications between parties to certain relationships reflects the
judgment that society will benefit more from candid discussions
in those relationships than it will lose from disclosure of those
discussions. A doctor-patient privilege encourages patients
to provide doctors with full information, and thus allows the
doctors to make accurate diagnoses and optimal treatment.
However, as I develop below, the doctor-patient privilege is not
a sure bet, and the many limitations on it should cause a patient
to be wary of full disclosure of unfavorable information to his
treating physician. In turn, that rational wariness on the part of
the patient may prevent the ultimate aim of the privilege in the
first place: getting the patient better.

A. Medical Ethics Favor Confidentiality
Can the doctor voluntarily disclose what the patient told
her? The American Medical Association says no, as a matter of
medical ethics:
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The information disclosed to a physician by a patient
should be held in confidence. The patient should feel free
to make a full disclosure of information to the physician
in order that the physician may most effectively provide
needed services. The patient should be able to make this
disclosure with the knowledge that the physician will
respect the confidential nature of the communication.
The physician should not reveal confidential information
without the express consent of the patient, subject to
certain exceptions which are ethically justified because
of overriding considerations. 1
The AMA acknowledges the possibility that the law may
have a different view of the confidentiality of patient communications, and instructs a doctor in this situation to first inform
the patient, presumably to allow the patient's lawyer to analyze
the legal situation and try to prevent the disclosure if possible:
When the disclosure of confidential information is
required by law or court order, physicians generally
should notify the patient. Physicians should disclose
the minimal information required by law, advocate
for the protection of confidential information and,
if appropriate, seek a change in the law. (III, IV, VII,
VIII). 2
B. The Legal Landscape

The question now becomes whether and when the law will
require, and a court order, a physician to testify or provide records reflecting communications made by a patient. The answer
depends on what court system is involved, and within that court
system, on what kind of case. Federal courts do not recognize
any doctor-patient privilege in federal criminal and federal
question civil cases, although one may occur in diversity cases.
On the other hand, Montana state law recognizes a doctorpatient privilege in civil cases but not in criminal cases, and even
in those civil cases, provides for ready waiver of the privilege.
1 http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/ pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/codemedical-ethics/opinionSOS.page, last accessed 8/11/2014. The exceptions listed
by the AMA are two: where the patient threatens serious bodily injury to himself
or another, and where a court orders disclosure.
2 Id.
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Montana's Statutory Doctor-Patient Privilege
~011tana state law provides an evidentia.ry pr_ivilege for commurucatlons from a patient to his doctor. M.C.A. 26-1-805. first
enacted in 1867, provides:
26-1-805. Doctor-patient privilege.
Except as provided in Rule 35, Montana Rules of Civil
Proce~ure, a licensed physician, surgeon, or dentist may
not, without the consent of the patient, be examined in a
civil action as to any information acquired in attending
the patient that was necessary to enable the physician,
surgeon, or dentist to prescribe or act for the patient.
A communication described in 45-9-104(7) is not a
privileged communication. (Emphasis added)
A. There is no doctor-patient privilege in Montana criminal actions
First and foremost, this privilege applies only in civil cases:
"in a civil action" means "not in a criminal action." Thus, there
is no doctor-patient privilege in criminal cases in Montana state
courts. The Montana Supreme Court so held, basing its opinion on the express language (bolded above) in the statute, in its
single case on the subject, State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405
P.2d 978 (1965).
Campbell was convicted of murdering his fiancee as she
ended her waitressing shift early one morning in Twin Bridges.
The admitted evidence against him included a bullet taken from
the defendant's own body (he apparently shot himself a couple
of times after he shot the victim, to make it look like a third
person had assaulted both). The doctor who treated Campbell
removed and kept the bullet at Campbell's request, "until turning it over to law enforcement, pursuant to a court order." 3
After rejecting Campbell's argument that the removal of the
bullet amounted to unconstitutional search and seizure, the
Court went on to deny his doctor-patient privilege argument:
Also in connection with the admission of the bullet
and X-rays, appellant urges that the physician-patient
privilege was violated. We hold with the great weight of
authority that this privilege is not available to appellant
in a criminal prosecution. See Anno.: 45 A.L.R. 1357,
superseded in 2 A.L.R.2d 647. The applicable statute in
Montana is R.C.M.1947, § 93-701-4, which provides in
part:
'There are particular relations in which it is the policy
of the law to encourage confidence and preserve it
inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be examined as a
witness in the following cases:

***
'4. A licensed physician or surgeon cannot, without the
consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as
to any information acquired in attending the patient,

which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act
for the patient.'
R.C.M.1947, § 94-7209, provides:
'The rules of evidence in civil actions are applicable also
to criminal actions, except as otherwise provided in this
code.' Section 94-7209, by its language, incorporates
into criminal procedure all that is applicable of Title
93, the Code of Civil Procedure. The one qualification
is 'except as otherwise provided by this code.' Section
93-701-4 sets forth five privileged relationships in
addition to that of physician-patient. Only in the case
of the physician-patient (sub-section 4) and one other
relationship (sub-section 6) is the qualifying language
'in a civil action' used. This would seem to be the kind
oflanguage limiting a rule to civil procedure alone as
was contemplated in the Provision in Section 94-7209,
'except as otherwise provided in this code.' Such a
construction is consistent with that given to essentially
the same statutes by the State of California. See People
v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 39 P. 207; People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.
App.2d 862, 145 P.2d 676. (Emphasis added)

State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 260-61, 405 P.2d 978,
984 (1965).
B. There especially is no doctor-patient privilege in criminal cases for fraudulently obtaining prescriptions for dangerous drugs.
The last sentence of Montana's doctor-patient privilege
states: "A communication described in 45-9-104(7) is not a
privileged communication." M.C.A. 45-9-104 is part of Title
45, entitled "Crimes." The subject of the title's Chapter 9 is
"Dangerous Drugs.'' The specific statute, 45-9-104, deals with
"the offense of fraudulently obtaining dangerous drugs;" subsection (7) says:
(7) knowingly or purposefully communicating false or
incomplete information to a practitioner with the intent
to procure the administration of or a prescription for a
dangerous drug. A communication of this information
for the purpose provided in this subsection is not a
privileged communication.
Because no doctor-patient privilege exists in criminal cases,
the two corollary sentences in the privilege and dangerous drug
statutes are technically unnecessary. Anything the patient said to
the doctor is admissible in any criminal prosecution (if relevant,
etc.), regardless of the patient's innocent or criminal purpose in
providing the information. Both of these sentences were added
to the Code by 2011 Montana Laws Ch. 194 (S.B. 210), perhaps
with the simple idea of making it clear that there really, really,
really is no privilege in these cases, really.
Evidence, page 22

3 146 Mont. at 257, 405 P.2d at 984.
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C. In civil cases, Rule 35 waives doctor-patient privilege
when the patient's condition is in controversy, either as a
claim or a defense, and when the patient requests a copy of
the other party's Rule 35 examination report.
The first phrase of the doctor-patient privilege is "Except
as provided in Rule 35, Montann Rules of Civil Procedure."
M.R.Civ.P. 35 (oh, howl love this intersection of Civil
Procedure and Evidence), part of the dis ovcry section of the
rules, covers physical and mental examin ations. As you recall,
a party may obtain (by agreement or court order, not automatically) a physical or mental e,xaminati.on of a person whose
condition is "in controversy."
The opponent and the person examined are entitle<l,
upon request, to a copy of the examiner's report. Rule 35
appears to impose, as a cost to such a request, the loss of the person's doctor-patient privilege:
(b) (4) Waiver of Privilege.
By requesting and obtaining the examiner' s report, by
deposing the examiner, or by commencing an a lion
or presenting a defense which puts a party's condition
at issue, the party examined waives any privilege it may
have - in that action or any other act ion involving
the same controversy - concerning testimony
about all treatments, prescriptions, consultations, or
examinations for the same condition.
The waiver
of any privilege does not apply to any treatment,
consultation, prescription, or examination for any
condition not related to the pending action: On a timely
motion for good cause and on notice to all parties
and the person to be examined, the court in which the
action is pending may issue an order to prohibit the
introduction of evidence of any such portion of any
person's medical record not related to the pending
action. (Emphasis added).
The examined party-usually, but not always, the plaintiffwho exercises his or her right to a report from or deposition
of the Rule 35 examining physician has no "privileged" objection to a discovery request for information from the plaintiffs
treating or litigation physicians about the same condition(s). In
fact, this "price" of is illusory, because the Rule then adds (out of
chronologic order) that waiver is also triggered by "commencing an action or presenting a defense which puts the party's
condition at issue."
Under M.R.Civ.P. 35, a plaintiff who sues for damages, alleging a physical or mental injury, waives any doctor-patient
privilege with regard to that injury when he files the complaint,
and thereafter must upon request provide the defense with all
medical records relating to the condition. The defendant may
also depose a treating doctor, and may require the doctor to
recount exactly what the patient told her about the condition,
including its origin. The legal effect is twofold: first, there really
is no doctor-patient privilege in personal injury cases (or other
civil cases where a physical or mental condition is grounds for
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either a claim or defense); second, a plaintiff should always
request the report and/or depose the Rule 35 examiner, because
she has already "paid" for the right.
Callahan v. Burton, a 1971 case, was the first case to apply the Rule 35 waiver to a plaintiff who put her own m edical
condition into c ntroversy when he filed a personal injury
action. 1he case involved a claim of medical malpractice agafost
cu1 ophthalrnologi t for a eged failure to cUagnose malignant
melanoma in the plaintiffs eye. The defense took the deposition of on of the plalatilfs treating physician , and then sought
private i.11terviews with him and another of the plaintitfs do tors. clhe trial judge applied the then- new Rule 35, and granted
the moti n for the interviews, reasoning that the plaintiffhad
waived all privilege when she sued. The Montana Supreme
Court affirmed, and in so doing explained the genesis of the
waiver-by-filing component of Rule 35:
The so-called physician-patient privilege is not a creature
of the common law but is solely a creature of statute.
Only approximately two-thirds of the states of the
United States have adopted a privilege-communication
statute. Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345,
348; 8 Wigmore. Evidence, s 2380 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
Montana did so in 1867 by enacting Section 93-701-4,
R.C.M.1947 ...
The physician-patient privilege is an anachronism which
has come under considerable criticism and attack as
the great volume of personal injury suits increased. 8
Wigmore, Evidence, s 2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961);
McCormick on Evidence, s 108.
The Montana Supreme Court notified all licensed
attorneys in. the state fMontana that a:n amendment
had been propo ed to Rule 35, M.R.Civ.P., which would
abolish the privilege whenever a plaintiff commenced
'an action whi b places in issue the mental or physical
condition of the pa(ty brini.,•ing the action .. ,. * regarding
the testimony of every person who bas treated,
prescribed, consulted or examined or may thereafter
treat, cons ult, prescribe or examine such patty in respect
to the same mental or physical condition * ,.. *.'

After notice of the proposed amendment was sent to all
counsel, attorneys were given to and including May 25,
1967, within which to prepare, serve and file me.n1oranda
in opposition or in support of the proposed rnle hange.
Ln addition, 16 lawyers were given permJssion to
appear in oral argument at a hearing to be held on the
proposed change June 9, 1967. ertain m difications
of the proposed amendment were submitted. One
proposed lhat the testimony of any treating and
attending physician be reduced t writing at pretrial
deposition. Another suggested amendment proposed
that treaUng and attending physicians' testimony should
n l il1 lude diagnosl.s, prognosis or expert opinion or
expert testimony but should be limited solely to the facts
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within the personal knowledge of the person. Neither
of these amendments was adopted when the Supreme
Court ordered the rule to be amended Sept. 29, 1967, and
proclaimed its effective date as Jan. 1, 1968.
Judge McClernan's order of April 28, 1970, [allowing
defense counsel to interview plaintiffs doctors alone and
in addition to the deposition] accorded with the new
rules and with these concepts.

is not one of the "methods" of discovery for which the
Rules of Civil Procedure provide ....
lt is' obvious, that if a method of discovery such as a
private interview is ordered by the court, the sanctions
and protections which are available under the Montana,
Rules of Civil Proce~ure for ordinary methods of
discovery become unavailable for private interviews ....

We conclude therefore, that a District Court, in allowing
and enforcing discovery in litigation before it, must
relate the discovery to one of the methods provided in
Rule 26(a), M.R.Civ.P. Any attempt to enforce a method
of discovery not provided by the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure is outside the power of the District Court. We
hold that the Court is without power to order a private
interview. To do so would defeat open disclosure, a
prime objective of the Rules of Discovery.

Callahan v. Burton, 157 Mont. 513, 521-23, 487 P.2d 515,
518-20 (1971) overruled by Jaap v. Dist. Court of Eighth Judicial
Dist., In & For Cascade Cnty., 191Mont.319, 623 P.2d 1389
(1981).
Ten years later, in Jaap, the Court reversed Callahan's result,
although it continued to find that the plaintiff had waived her
doctor-patient privilege when she filed her personal injury
complaint. The difference between the two cases lies solely in the
effect of that waiver. The Jaap court reasoned that the defendant
Jaap v. Dist. Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., In & For
was conducting discovery and thus was governed by, and limCascade Cnty., 191 Mont. 319, 322-324, 623 P.2d 1389,
ited to, the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
1391(1981). 4
which allow for interrogatories depositions but contain no
Because doctors are forbidden by their own duty of confiprovision for court-compelled private interviews of treating
dentiality
from disclosing patient information without permisphysicians:
sion of the patient or legal process, they generally will refer any
There is no question but that under Rule 35(b)(2)
requests for private interviews to the patient, and thus to the
M.R.Civ.P., as the same is promulgated iil Montana,
patient's attorney. Thus, as a practical matter, defense counJulie Jaap, by commencing an action for damages for her
Sel can certainly invoke the waiver provisions of Rule 35, but
personal injuries which placed in issue the mental and
can only get access to the desired information through formal
physical condition arising from the accident, waived any
discovery or by agreement with opposing counsel, on stipulated
physician-patient privilege as to her mental oi' physical
conditions.
condition in controversy. Accepting as a premise that
The Court again affirmed its allegiance to the Rule 35 waiverthe physician-patient privilege has been waived; may the
by-filing provision in a case where a mother sued for injuries to
District Court, by way of discovery, order that defense
her minor child, asserting that the mother also suffered mental
counsel may engage in informal, private interviews With
injuries as a result of the accident. The defense sought discovthe physicians treating Julie Jaap for her alleged injuries?
ery of the mother's prior medical records to test her claim as to
inception and causation of her mental condition. The mother
Put another way, granting that plaintiff has waived
refuSed to provide full copies of the records, instead allowing
any physician-patient privilege relating to her mental
her own doctors access to them and having them testify that
and physical condition in controversy, what limits, if
there was no causal relationship. The trial judge denied the
any, circumscribe the power of the District Court in
defendants' motion to compel discovery. The Supreme Court
authorizing and enforcing discovery under the Montana
found this to be an abuse of discretion:
Rules of Civil Procedure?
'36 Medical records are private and "deserve the utmost
Although we agree with that portion of the District
constitutional protection." State v. Nelson (1997), 283
Court order which stated that once the physicianMont. 231, 242, 941P.2d441, 448. A.rticle II, Section 10,
patient privilege has been waived, the physician is to be
of the Montana Constitution guarantees informational
considered as any other witness, we conclude that the
privacy in the sanctity of one's medical records. Nelson,
District Court does not have power, under the rules of
283 Mont. at 242, 941 P.2d at 448. However, "[w]hen
discovery, to order private interviews between counsel
a party claims damages for physical or mental injury,
for one party and possible adversary witnesses, expert
he or she places the extent of that physical or mental
or not, on the other. We derive this conclusion from an
examination of the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to
4 In Osterm/llerv.Alvord, 222 Mont. 208, 720 P.2d 1199 (1986), the Court distinguished Its holdlng In Jaall that a trial court cannot compel private Interviews
discovery.
The methods by which discovery may be obtained, under
the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, are set out in Rule
26{a) ...
Obviously a private interview of an adversary witness
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between a plalntlff's doctor and defense counsel from the situation In that case,
where during trial plaintiff's counsel Indicated he was not going to call plaintiff's
treating dentist and the court then denied plaintiff's objection to a defense Interview, with plaintiff's counsel present, of the dentist to prepare him for testimony In
the defense case.

Evidence, page24
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injury at issue and waives his or her statutory right to
coniidentiality to the extent that it is necessary for a
defendant to discover whether plaintiffs current medical
or physical condition is the result of some other cause."
State ex rel. Mapes v. District Court (1991), 250 Mont.
524, 530, 822 P.2d 91, 94 ....
' 39 In the present case, Kristin conunenced an action
for damages for her personal iujmies which placed in
issue her mental and physical condition arising from
the accident... .In doing this, she waived any physicianpatient privilege as to a mental or physical condition in
controversy. Jaap, 191 Mont. at 322, 623 P.2d at 1391;
Rule 35(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P. This includes testimony her
physicians may have provided concerning her prior
mental condition. Kristin did not produce records
from before Hunter's accident because the records were
"sensitive and personal." She did produce redacted
medical records for the period after Hunter's accident
which she determined were relevant. The State did
view the redacted portion of Kristin's medical records.
However, the State sought all Kristin's mental and
medical health records from ten years before Hunter's
accident (1985) through time of trial.
'40 Kristin claims that because she provided her doctors
with complete copies of the disputed medical records,
and her doctors stated the record showed no causal
correlation between any previous injury or condition
and her current injuries, this ends the inquiry into the
medical records. Kristin argues that the State should be
denied access to the records because it did not present
any expert medical opinion that her alleged injuries
were more probably than not caused by some factor
other than witnessing Hunter's fall. The fallacy in this
argument is that there was no way that the State could
have provided this opinion because it was denied access
to the very records whlch would have enabled it to make
this determination. The court's denial of these records
only allowed for one-sided review of the medical records
by Kristin's physicians.
' 41 The State was prejudiced when it was denied the
right to defend itself in an informed manner. It had
the right to discover ev.idence related to prior physical
or mental conditions possibly connected to Kristin's
current damages. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont. at 530,
822 P.2d at 94. The State is not entitled to unnecessarily
invade Kristin's privacy by exploring totally unrelated
or irrelevant matters. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont. at
530, 822 P.2d at 95. However, because Kristin presented
her entire medical records file to her treating physicians
and asked for their expert medical opinions, which
were at least in part based on the records which were
denied to the defense, she waived her statutory right to
confidentiality but only to the extent that it is necessary
for the State to discover for itself whether Kristin's
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current medical or physical condition is the result of
some other cause. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont. at
530, 822 P.2d at 94. The State thus has a right to review
Kristin's medical records to determine whether her
present condition is attributable to some preexisting
cause.
'42 The similarity between Kristin's present claims
and those for which she was previously treated shows
the possible correlation between her pre-accident
records and her present claims. Kristin's claims
involve emotional distress, loss of consortium and
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The record
indicates that prior to Hunter's accident, she was taking
medications which can be used to treat depression,
headaches. sleep disorders and anxiety. The connection
between Kristin's present claims and her past conditions
is not attenuated as it was in Mix where access to records
was denied. Mix, 239 Mont. at 360, 781 P.2d at 756.
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's denial of
the State's motion to compel production of the medical
records.

Henricksen v. State, 2004 MT 20, 319 Mont. 307, 317-20,
84 P.3d 38, 48-49.
Thus, although Montana's statute does provide a first-line
doctor-patient privilege in civil cases, even that privilege is not
absolute and may be waived despite the doctor's and patient's
intent to maintain confidentiality. A person who has sought
medical treatment necessarily must choose between confidentiality and later legal redress for thatinjury or condition. Further,
if the patient does become a plaintiff, she must realize that all of
her prior medical records pertaining to her claimed injurywill
be discoverable and admissible, and might involve having her
doctor recount (unwillingly) to a jury everything she told him.
The patient does control the waiver, but preserving the privilege
may require her to walk away from a legal claim or defense.

D. When doctor-patient privilege does apply
in civil cases in Montana state courts, it covers
only 'information necessary to enable physician, surgeon or dentist to prescribe or act for
the patient.'
Even before Montana was a state, the territorial court
invoked the doctrine of strict construction of the privilege
between doctor and patient. In Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50
(1877), the male defendant was indicted for his marriage to his
half-sister, Sarah Parker, who was called to testify, unwillingly,
against him. Two doctors also testified, on the fact of sexual
intercourse and the knowledge of the partners of the biological
link between them. The Territorial Supreme Court refused to
apply any privilege to their testimony:
The evidence of Doctors Yager and Smith was properly
admitted. The statutes of this Territory provide that a
physician shall not testify without the consent of the
patient as to any information he may have acquired
while attending the same. Codified Statutes, p. 125, §
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450. Sarah Parker and not John Corbett was the patient,
and she gave her consent, and that was sufficient to make
them competent witnesses.
Physicians were not exempted at common law from
disclosing confidential communications, confided
to them in their professional character. Greenl. on
Ev.,§ 247; Phill. on Ev., marg. p. 136. We are therefore
confined strictly to the words of the statute in
considering this point, and that, we have seen, limits
the confidential communications to those made by the
patient to the physician in his professional character,
and were necessary to enable him to prescribe for the
same. The communications made to Doctors Yager
and Smith by the defendant do not come within the
exemption specified in the statutes. (Emphasis added)

Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50, 59 (1877}. 5
Conversely, when the privilege does exist, its waiver via Rule
35 extends only to the condition in controversy:
Nonetheless, the waiver is not unlimited; the defendant
may only discover records related to prior physical or
mental conditions if they relate to currently claimed
damages. The plaintiffs right to confidentiality is
balanced against the defendant's right to defend itself
in an informed manner. State ex rel. Mapes, 250 Mont.
at 530, 822 P.2d at 94. A defendant "is not entitled to
unnecessarily invade plaintiffs privacy by exploring
totally unrelated or irrelevant matters." State ex rel.
Mapes, 250 Mont. at 530, 822 P.2d at 95 ....
,- 38 A defendant is not allowed unfettered access to
all medical records he believes may help his defense.
In State v. Mix, the trial court refused access to records
because the subject matter was irrelevant and too remote
to the case. State v. Mix (1989), 239 Mont. 351, 360, 781
P.2d 751, 756. In that case, a defendant charged with
deliberate homicide sought medical records regarding
the victim's asthma condition. Mix, 239 Mont. at 360,
781 P.2d at 756.

Henricksen v. State, 2004 MT 20, 319 Mont. 307, 317-18, 84
P.3d 38, 48.

E. The privilege belongs to patient, not dodor
In Hier v. Farmers Mutual Insurance, the deceased patient's
estate sued for payment on the fire insurance policy. The insurer
defended on the ground that the decedent himself set the fire;
the estate claimed that he had been insane at the time, robbing him of the requisite intent to vitiate the policy. The estate
called the insured's treating physician at trial, and the insurance
company objected. The judge's decision to allow the testimony
anyway was affirmed by the Supreme Court:
5 The territorial version of the privilege statute apparently covered criminal as
well as civil cases, but I have not gone the extra step to actually research this.
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Dr. Cloud was called as a witness for the administrator
and was allowed to detail the facts as to his examinations
and treatment ofTemmel at times previous to the
fire. He was also allowed to state his opinion as to his
sanity. Strenuous objection was made to the admission
of his testimony on. the ground of statutory privilege
as contained in section 10536, subdivision 4, Revised
Codes, which has to do with the disability of a physician
or surgeon to testify without the consent of his patient
in an'y civil action as to information acquired in
attending the patient which was necessary to enable him
to prescribe or act for the patient. In considering this
matter we must have in mind the fact that the object of
the statute, and of all such statutes, is not to absolutely
disqualify a physician from testifying, but to enable
a patient to secure medical aid without betrayal of
confidence. 28 R.C.L. p. 542. The same authority states:
"The patient may therefore waive objection and permit
the physician to testify. In other words, the privilege is
the privilege of the patient and not of the physician;
and by the great weight of authority, if the patient
assents the court will compel the physician to answer.
*** The physician cannot waive the statutory privilege
and testify against the wishes of his patient." In this
case it must be understood that the statute could only
apply on behalf of the patient, Temmel. It could not be
asserted by the physician, and we fail to see wherein the
Insurance Company had any right to assert the privilege
as against the plaintiff in this case. It was never intended
that such a claim of privilege could be asserted by an
adverse party to defeat the proof of an alleged ailment
which was a necessary element to the plaintiffs cause
of action.
We may assume all of the other facts of this case without
the death of the insured and then assume that the
insured lived to recover his sanity and thereafter brought
suit upon the insurance policy. Unquestionably, he
could have waived the privilege proposition and could
have called upon the doctor to testify in the matter. In
5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, p. 4194, it is said:
"By the weight of authority, however, it is held that since
the patient may waive the privilege for the purpose of
protecting his right, the same waiver may be made by
those who represent him after his death, for the purpose
of protecting rights acquired by him." (Emphasis added)

Hier v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P.2d
831, 836-37 (1937). (The insurance company also argued that
there was no "formal waiver" in the record, but the Court held
that the tender of the doctor's evidence sufficed.)
Federal Treatment of the Doctor-Patient Privilege
The federal doctor-patient privilege is very different: there
Evidence, page :l6
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communications between physicians (who are not psychiatrists)
and patients. See also, Wei v. Bodtier, 127 P.R.D. 91, 97 (D.N.J.
i989)("ther~ is no physician-patient privilege as a matter of fedis none in federal criminal cases or in federa! civil cases where
eral com.Inoa or statutory law."); Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219
state law does not provide the rule of decision. The Federal
F.R.D. 164 (N.D.CA., 2003)(" The physician-patient privilege
Rules of Evidence approach privilege on a common-law basis.
is not recognized by federal common law, federal statute, or the
When the Advisory Committee first promulgated the FRE
U.S. Constitution.")
'
and the Supreme Court sent its draft to Congress, Article V on
As the last sentence ofFRE 501 states, however, a federal
Privileges contained nine specified evidentiary privileges. (None, court applies state law as to the doctor-patient privilege, in
however, covered communications between a physician and a · federal case.s where state law is used to determine liability. This
patient). Congress rejected this approach and instead whittled ·
pfovisidn is used largely but not exclusively in diversity of
Article V down to a single rule, 501. The current version of FRE citizenship cases in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1332. It also
501, virtually unchanged since the inception of the FRE in 1975, governs privilege under federal statutes which explicitly refer to
states:
state law, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671,
2674.
RULE 501. PRIVILEGE IN GENERAL
Federal Jlule 35 Waiver of Doctor-Patient Privilege is
Qiffecent · ·
·
The common law - as interpreted by United States
·· · The current Montana version of Rule 35 was meant to mircourts in the light of reason and experience -:- governs
ror.the federal versi~n. The Montana Commission Comment to
a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides
the. 2011
otherwise:
. . version of M.R.Civ.P. 35 states:
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the United States Constitution;
a federal statute; or
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a
claim or defense for which state law supplies tile rule of
decision.
Setting aside the last sentence of FRE 501 for now, the question becomes whether the federal courts, in "light of reason and
experience," hold that the communications between a doctor
and her patient are privileged in non-diversity cases tded in
federal court. The answer is a resounding "No." The Supreme
Court, in a case which established a psychotherapist'-patient
privilege for federal court, differentiated psychotherapy from
treatment by a physician:
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is "rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and proceed successfully
on the basis of a physical examination, objective
information supplied by the patient, and the results of
diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast,
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust
in which the patient is willing to make a frank and
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and
fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for
which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of
confidential communications made during counseling
sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this
reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary
for successful treatment.

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928, 135
L. Ed. 2d 337 {1996). The Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege there, but has never gone on to protect
6 Per Jaffee, the federal privilege covers communications between a patient
and: a licensed psychiatrist; a licensed psychologist; and a licensed cllnlcal social
worker.
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The l~nguage of Rule 35 has been amended as part of the
ge11era1 restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more
easily understood. The changes also have been made to
mike.style and terminology consistent throughout these
rules and to conform to the recent changes in the Federal
Rules;
The Committee has adopted Federal Rule 35 in its
- entirety with one addition in Rule 35(b)(4) adapted
from previous Rule 35(b)(2), limiting the waiver of
<foctor-patient privilege in instances where treatment,
c;onsultation, prescription, or examination relates to a
mental or physical condition "not related to the pending
action."
Notwithstanding the stated intent of the Montana
Commission to mirror F.R.Civ.P. 35, the federal version of Rule
35 relating to privilege currently is, in fact, quite different from
M.R.Civ.P. 35. F.R.Civ.P. 35(b)(4) provides for a waiver of the
privilege if.the examinee requests a copy of the examination
{eport or deposes the defense examiner, but does not further
provide for waiver simply by filing a complaint or answer putting the condition into controversy:
(4) Waiver of Privilege. By requesting and obtaining
the examiner's report, or by deposing the examiner,
the party examined waives any privilege it may
have-in that action or any other action involving the
same controversy-concerning testimony about all
examinations of the same condition.
The 1970 federal Advisory Committee Note to Rule 35(b)(3)
states:
The subdivision also makes clear that reports of
examining physicians are discoverable not only
under Rule 3S(b) but under other rules as well. To be
sure, If the report is privileged, then discovery is not
permissible under any rule other than Rule 35(b) and it
is permissjble under Rule 3S(b) onJy if the party requests
a copy of the report of examination made by the other
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party's d ctor. lier v. De Have n, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. ir.
1952). cert.. denied 345 U.S. 936 ( 1.953). But if the rep rt
is un privileged and is subject to discovery under th
pr visions of rules other than Ruf 35(b)- su b ~l s Ru lt~s
34 or 26(b)(3) or (4)- discovcry hould not d pend
upon wheth r the person examin d demands a opy of
the report.

Under the circumstances presented here, where the state
law provides the rule of decision, and Arizona law of
physician-patient privilege expressly prohibits ex parte
interviews of treating physicians as a matter of public
policy and to preserve the integrity of the privilege, this
Court declines to allow the ex parte interview by counsel
for the United State~ of Plaintiffs treating physicians.

1 he key to understandi11g this apparent discrepan y between the Monta na and federal Rules 35 regardin g waiver of the
privilege is in the p rivilege itself. Because there generally is no
doctor-patient privilege in federal com1, there generally is nothing to waive. In federal criminal cases and in most fed ral civ.il
cases (except where state law provides the rule of decision), the
opponent is entitled to discovery and admission of the patient's
medical information, including the substance of hfa commu nications with his doctor, even over the objection of both the
doctor and the patient. No action by the patient can establish
a privilege, nor can any inaction (e.g., deciding not to sue) save
the privilege.
The language in the 1970 Note "if the report is privileged" applies only to federal civil cases (primarily diversity or
Federal Tort Claims cases) where state law governs the substantive issues. Thus, in these cases, the plaintiff may be able to sue
and still maintain privilege over her communications with her
doctor unless and until she asks for a copy of the defense physical examination report. THERE IS A HUGE CAVEAT HERE!!!
Remember Erie v. Tompkins Ry. ?7 Holding generally that in diversity cases, under the Rules of Decision Act, 8 federal courts are
supposed to apply state substantive law and federal procedural
law? The very reason Congress inserted the last sentence into
FRE 501 ·was to resolve any substance/procedural debate with
regard to privilege. It did not, however, specify, whether the
state's discovery and other procedural rules regarding a privilege
would also trump the F.R.C.P. provisions.
In Benally v. U.S., 216 F.R.D. 478 (2003), a patient sued
the Indian Health Service for medical malpractice during a
Caeserean section. The Court, in ruling on a defense motion
for ex parte interviews wit h the plaintiff treating doctors, applied Ar.izona state law not only to the existence of a privilege
but also to the discovery procedu res involvi ng t bose doctors:

Benally v. United States, 216 F.R.D. 478, 479-81 (D. Ariz.
2003). See also, Hampton v. Schimpjf, 188 F.R.D. 589 (D. Mont.
1999), where Judge Donald Molloy applied the Montana
Suprem'e Court's Jaap holding in a federal diversity case, without as much analysis of F.R.E. 501 as occurred in Benally. Of
course, these are both federal trial court orders, which merely
reflects one of two possible approaches to this issue. The U.S.
Supreme Court has not yet taken a case that would resolve this
wrinkle in privilege law, and such a case could develop from the
difference between the Montana and federal Rules 35 regarding
waiver of the doctor-patient privilege.

There is no physician-patient privilege under federal
statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v.
Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791
(5th Cir.1993).
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671,
state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with state law." Fed. Evid. R:ule 501.
The state of Arizona recognizes the physician-patient
privilege. Duquette v. Superior Court, 161Ariz.269, 778
P.2d 634 (Ariz.App.1989) ....

Bottom Line: Much Uncertainty
Montana recognizes a privilege for doctor-patient communications in civil cases only, but not in criminal cases. In
Montana civil cases, the privilege is easily waived if litigation
involves the condition for which the communication was made.
The federal courts do not recognize any doctor-patient privilege, but will apply a state privilege if the case is ultimately to be
decided through state substantive law. When the federal courts
do recognize the privilege, it is not clear whether the state or the
federal version of Rule 35, with its waiver language, will apply.
Of course, each tribal court also has its own law about doctorpatient privilege (which I simply do not have room to lay out
here). Could you pass a pop quiz on the status of the doctorpatient privilege? Or even a true/false test question: "There is
a doctor-patient privilege in Montana"? And you are a lawyer,
with three years oflaw study and some actual legal practice.
What is a non-lawyer to do?
The purpose of every privilege is to encourage full and frank
communication between the parties to the specified relationship, to achieve sorpe societally desirable end. That end, where
the doctor-patient privilege is recognized, is full information to
the physician so that the patient's medical health can be optimized. Unfortunately, when the patient avails herself of medical
advice, she usually can't predict if there will be litigation involving the condition and if so, in which court system and which
type of case. Without this information, it is impossible to predict
whether or not her statements to her doctor can be discovered
and used against her.
In ruling that the federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the U.S. Supreme Court observed
that a large majority of states had such a privilege and that fact
was relevant to the Court's decision:
In addition, given the importance of the patient's
understanding that her communications with her
therapist will not be publicly disclosed, any State's
promise of confidentiality would have little value if
the patient were aware that the privilege would not

7 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
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regard to the doctor-patient privilege in Montana, despite a
nominally simple privilege statute, is exactly what the Supreme
Court prophesied: functionally uncertain, even though it
may purport to be certain. It is "little better than no privilege
at all" because it does not provide any clear guidance to the
beneficiary of the privilege at the time she must decide what to
communicate.
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be honored in a federal court. 12 Denial of the federal
privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of
the state legislation that was enacted to foster these
confidential communications.

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. l, 13, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1930, 135
L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996). 9
The Court also stressed the need for certainty as to the existence and extent of any privilege, at the time the communication
is made:
As we explained in Upjohn, if the purpose of the privilege
is to be served, the participants in the confidential
conversation "must be able to predict with some degree
of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports
to be certain but results in widely varying applications
by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."
(Citation omitted).
518 U.S. at 18, 116 S.Ct. at 1932. The current situation with
9 Justice Scalla's dissent on this point is characteristically caustic: "This Is a novel
argument indeed. A sort of Inverse pre-emption: The truth-seeking functions of
federal courts must be adjusted so as not to conflict with the policies of the States.
This reasoning cannot be squared with Giiiock, which declined to recognize an evldentlary privilege for Tennessee legislators In federal prosecutions, even though
the Tennessee Constitution guaranteed It In state criminal proceedings. Giiiock,
445 U.S., at 368, 100 S.Ct., at 1191. Moreover, since, as I shall discuss, state policies
regarding the psychotherapist privilege vary considerably from State to State, no
uniform federal policy can possibly honor most of them. If furtherance of state
policies is the name of the game, rules of privilege In federal courts should vary
from State to State, la Erle R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed.
1188 (1938):'
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 24-25, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1935, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1996)
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a shock to Pat, his brothers say no one is more
deserving.
"He's devoted his life to representing people
who might not have a voice in our courts,"
Thomas said. "He certainly is not afraid to pick
up the argument for people who might not have
a voice. That is in the finest tradition of our
profession.
"When he told me about the award, I said,
'Well deserved. And maybe a little bit overdue."
When asked what he has been most proud of
over the course of his career, Pat McKittrick said
it is being able to be of service to the working men
and women of Montana.
'Tm very proud of representing the working
person throughout my entire career and being
able to help quite a few of the working people
throughout the years," Pat said. "It's been a wonderful career. That feeling of accomplishment of
helping people in their time of conflict and need
has been very rewarding."
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Lessons for the patient
The doctor-patient privilege is much more limited than most
patients, and perhaps doctors, realize. Although the doctor intends to keep confidential what her patient tells her, she cannot
do so:
• where the patient is involved in a criminal proceeding in
Montana state court;
• where the patient later bases a legal claim or defense on
the condition in a civil proceeding in Montana state court;
• where the patient is the subject of a Rule 35 examination
in Montana or federal court, and requests a copy of the report
of, or deposes, the examiner;
• where the patient is involved in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, in federal court, except the relatively few cases where
state law provides the rule of decision.
Neither the doctor nor the patient is likely to know at the
time of the appointment which type of court proceedings, and
thus whether in fact any privilege will protect the communications made in the appointment. Given this situation, the patient
should assume there is no doctor-patient privilege at all, and
thus that anything she says to her doctor may be used against
her by her adversary in some future court proceeding.
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.

BEA STAR
WITH THE BAR
The Bozeman rock band The Buzztnnes will be performing
at the Wednesday, Sept. 24. opening reception far the

4Dth Annual Meeting in Big Sky.
The opening reception will be at Buck's T-4 Lodge
(about amile past the Big Sky turn off)
from 5to 7p.m.
Some of the members of The Buzztones are also local attorneys.
The band would welcome any cameo performers to sing or play an
instrument on asong or two. If you are interested in joining the band
onstage. contact Buzz Tarlow at 406-586-9714 before Aug. 30
to discuss your possibilities of stardom.
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